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Despite the fact that most emerging diseases stem from the transmission of pathogenic agents from animals to humans, the
factors that mediate this process are still ill defined. What is known, however, is that the interface between humans and
animals is of paramount importance in the process. This review will discuss the importance of the human-animal interface
to the disease emergence process. We also provide an overview of factors that are believed to contribute to the origin and
global spread of emerging infectious diseases and offer suggestions that may serve as future prevention strategies, such as
social mobilization, public health education, behavioral change, and communication strategies. Because there exists no
comprehensive global surveillance system to monitor zoonotic disease emergence, the intervention measures discussed herein
may prove effective temporary alternatives.
Contemporary pandemics and outbreaks of disease, such as the
current H1N1 influenza pandemic, as well as the emergence of
H5N1 influenza virus and severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS)–associated coronavirus, serve as poignant reminders of
our global vulnerability to emergent threats to human health
and our current inability to predict or prevent such events.
However, despite the seemingly unpredictable nature of disease
emergence, there are lessons to be learned from the origins of
recently emerged diseases as well as those that have their origins
in the more distant past, lessons that may offer clues as to how
future infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics may be pre-
vented. The challenge lies in using the accumulated, albeit in-
complete, knowledge gained from emergent diseases of our past
to identify practical solutions and strategies aimed at detecting
and halting future threats.
Here, we review the field’s current understanding of the or-
igins of infectious diseases and the factors that contribute to
their emergence. In particular, we highlight the importance of
the zoonotic transmission of pathogenic agents from animals
to humans, the favored mechanism by which emergent diseases
have come to afflict humans throughout history [1–3]. Indeed,
one key lesson from past pandemics is the pivotal importance
of the human-animal interface. Improving our understanding
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of this interface will be crucial to future pandemic prevention
efforts.
ZOONOTIC DISEASE EMERGENCE
The majority of all human infectious diseases and pandemics
have originated through the cross-species transmission of mi-
croorganisms from animals to humans, overwhelmingly in the
Old World [1, 3]. However, because most animal pathogens
are not readily transmitted to humans [4, 5], it follows that for
an animal pathogen to become a specialized pathogen in hu-
mans, multiple variables must combine in a dynamic and as
yet not fully understood process of cross-species transmission.
For an animal pathogen to become a successful human path-
ogen, it must evolve into a pathogen capable of not only in-
fecting humans, but maintaining long-term human-to-human
transmission without the need for reintroduction from the orig-
inal animal host. This process can be categorized into five pro-
gressive stages (reviewed by Wolfe et al [3]). Stage 1 involves
animal microbes that are not present in humans under natural
conditions, such as most malarial plasmodia. When a pathogen
evolves such that it can be transmitted to a human under
natural conditions but cannot support sustained human-to-
human transmission, it has entered stage 2. Examples of such
pathogens include tularemia bacilli, Nipah, rabies, and West
Nile viruses. Transition from stage 2 and into stage 3 is defined
by secondary transmission between humans. Stage 3 includes
pathogens that undergo only a few cycles of secondary trans-
mission between humans, such as Ebola, Marburg, and human
monkeypox viruses, whereas stage 4 includes diseases that exist
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Figure 1. Zoonotic disease emergence model outlining the 5 stages of pathogen emergence from animals to humans.
in animals but which undergo long sequences of secondary
human-to-human transmission without the involvement of an-
imal hosts, such as influenza A, Vibrio cholerae, and dengue
virus. Stage 5, in contrast, represents diseases that are exclusive
to humans. Agents responsible for some of history’s most trou-
bling diseases belong to stage 5 and include pathogens such as
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, smallpox, and
tuberculosis [3].
THE HUMAN AND ANIMAL INTERFACE
The disease emergence model above provides a construct for
how pathogens emerge from animals and illustrates the con-
tinuum of animal pathogen infectivity in the human popula-
tion. However, relatively little is known about the factors that
mediate transition from one stage to the next as a pathogen of
animal origin scales the stages of this paradigm (Figure 1), ever
increasing its ability to reside in the human population and be
transmitted throughout it. What is known, however, is that the
interface between humans and animals is of paramount im-
portance in the process. As we increase our interactions with
animals through hunting, the trading of animal foods, animal
husbandry practices, wet markets, and the domestication of
animals or exotic pets, the probability of cross-species trans-
mission dramatically increases.
It is now generally accepted that the hunting and butchering
of wild nonhuman primates in the early 20th century led to
the introduction of simian immunodeficiency virus into the
human population, giving rise to our modern day HIV pan-
demic [6]. In our own work, we have demonstrated that the
traditional practice of hunting and butchering nonhuman pri-
mates continues to be a gateway for the zoonotic transmission
of retroviruses. For instance, among central Africans reporting
contact with nonhuman primate blood and body fluids through
hunting, butchering, and keeping primate pets, we identified a
wide array of primate T lymphotropic viruses [7], including 2
novel viruses: one that is distinct from all other known primate
T-lymphotropic viruses, now designated human T lympho-
tropic virus subtype 4 (HTLV-4), and a second that is similar
to other nonhuman primate T lymphotropic virus subtype 3
viruses that had not previously been described as infecting hu-
mans. These results demonstrate that entry of pathogens into
the human population via contact with nonhuman primates is
an ongoing, dynamic process. In fact, zoonotic transmission of
viruses occurs on an astonishingly regular basis. In a serological
survey of 11000 rural Cameroonian villagers with reported ex-
posure to primates, we found that 1% had antibodies to simian
foamy virus [8], suggesting that populations exposed to animal
reservoirs of disease are constantly assailed by zoonotic agents.
Presumably, the likelihood of any one zoonotic agent becoming
a human pathogen is dependent upon a number of factors.
Multiple introductions into the human population may be nec-
essary before a zoonotic agent establishes itself as a human
pathogen and the determinants of cross-species tropism are still
ill defined, as are the factors that influence whether infection
causes disease. However, the frequency with which the human
population is exposed to a potential zoonotic agent is likely to
be an important determinant in disease emergence.
The course that a pathogen of animal origin takes into the
human population varies. The SARS outbreak originated from
bats of the genus Rhinolophus, and its human emergence is
believed to have been facilitated through intermediate hosts in
the wet markets of southern China [9, 10]. The current H1N1
influenza epidemic appears to have arisen in North America
primarily through the reassortment of viruses of swine origin
[11, 12]. The species of animal that harbors the pathogen, the
nature of human interaction with that animal, and the fre-
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quency of these interactions all likely modulate the risk of
zoonotic transmission [3]. Understanding this complex pro-
cess will be important to combating future disease emergence.
Therefore, further investigation into the interactions that hu-
mans have with animals (as a potential reservoir of disease),
and conditions that influence this interaction, is warranted. As
an example, despite the fact that chimpanzees have an extremely
small population size and human contact with them is infre-
quent, their close phylogenetic relationship to our own species
likely played an important role in our acquiring HIV from
chimpanzees, as did the nature of our relationship with them.
Presumably, the odds of contracting HIV would have been
much lower had humans not been engaged in hunting chim-
panzees, a practice that offers many opportunities for exposure
to zoonotic agents through contact with biological fluids and
tissue.
The human-animal interface is fluid and our interaction with
other species, and any potential zoonotic agents they may pos-
sess, is variable. The frequency and type of human-animal in-
teraction fluctuates in response to other external factors that,
in turn, influence the potential for transmission of zoonotic
agents. For instance, socioeconomic factors are hypothesized
to be a major determinant of the spatial distribution of emerg-
ing infectious disease events [1]. Socioeconomic pressures in-
fluence bushmeat hunting, a practice that is believed to be a
major contributor to disease emergence [13], by obliging some
populations to hunt to meet basic nutritional requirements in
response to food availability [14]. Similarly, studies of Lassa
fever in Guinea and Sierra Leone directly correlate the risk of
infection with Lassa fever, a viral hemorrhagic fever caused by
an arenavirus transmitted by rodents, with poor housing and
food storage conditions in refugee camps and other desperately
poor communities [15, 16]. Other factors are also thought to
have the potential to influence zoonotic disease emergence. For
instance, the loss of biodiversity is believed to be an important
contributing factor to zoonosis [17], and studies conducted in
the Congo Basin and Rift Valley suggest that deforestation and
climate change play important roles in the risk of zoonotic
transmission from wildlife to humans [18]. Likewise, defor-
estation and climate change are hypothesized to have been
causal events that led to the 1998 emergence of Nipah virus
from fruit bats to pig livestock and, subsequently, to the farm
workers within the Kinta district of Perak state in Peninsular
Malaysia, resulting in hundreds of reported cases of acute viral
encephalitis [19–22]. However, the precise causal relationship
between these human-animal interface factors and how they
influence the dynamics of zoonotic disease emergence is not
fully elucidated, nor is the interconnectedness of the various
factors (eg, socioeconomic factors and deforestation) well un-
derstood. Defining cause and effect relationships may provide
valuable clues as to how would-be emergent diseases might be
prevented.
PREVENTION OF DISEASE EMERGENCE
AND PANDEMICS
Current global disease control focuses almost exclusively on
responding to pandemics after they have already spread globally
[23]. Nevertheless, dramatic failures in pandemic control, such
as the ongoing lack of success in HIV vaccine development 25
years into the pandemic, have shown that this wait-and-re-
spond approach is not sufficient and that the development of
systems to prevent novel pandemics before they are established
should be considered imperative to human health. Had we had
such mature systems in place, we may have averted the H1N1
influenza pandemic that is currently unfolding. The early de-
tection of emergent threats to human health is all the more
important given the speed with which disease causing agents
are now capable of being distributed around the globe through
air travel [24] and the global trade of animals as potential
reservoirs of disease [25]. Because the success of a pathogen
depends on its ability to spread from human to human and
on the number of susceptible humans, our ability to cross
continents in a single day poses a unique new challenge to
emerging infectious disease control. Past studies have high-
lighted the importance of global travel to the spread of pan-
demic disease [26–28], and the recent emergence and subse-
quent global spread of H1N1 influenza virus eloquently il-
lustrates how our global interconnectedness can affect the
worldwide distribution of a new virus, one that may other-
wise have remained a regional phenomena in an era before
global transit.
The Committee on Achieving Sustainable Global Capacity
for Surveillance and Response to Emerging Diseases of Zoo-
notic Origin was convened by the Institute of Medicine and
the National Research Council to assess the feasibility, needs,
and challenges of developing a future and sustainable global
disease surveillance program [29]. As the committee’s report
comprehensively expresses, our current disease surveillance sys-
tem and our ability to identify emergent diseases early are in-
adequate. Implementing all of the committee’s recommenda-
tions would represent a significant step forward in achieving a
well-integrated zoonotic disease surveillance system, but we are
still far from realizing this goal. Given the fact that more than
one-half of emerging infectious diseases have resulted from
zoonotic transmission [1] and that the human–animal interface
is so pivotal to the process of disease emergence, it stands to
reason that the most effective strategy in terms of early detection
of an emergent pathogenic threat would focus on conducting
surveillance of humans highly exposed to animals and within
the animal populations to which they are routinely exposed.
Despite this, there exists no systematic global effort to monitor
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for pathogens emerging from animals to humans in “at-risk”
populations, and we are probably years from having such a
system in place.
Although a global surveillance system for pandemic preven-
tion is still far from reality, there may be more immediate,
interim measures that may be taken to mitigate the risk of
zoonotic transmission, even in the absence of a global sur-
veillance effort. In situations where humans and animals are
in close contact, behavioral change approaches may be a pre-
ventative step to reducing the risk of zoonotic transmission.
Behavioral modification campaigns have previously been used
in combating outbreaks of known infectious diseases [30–32].
For instance, a behavioral modification campaign was launched
in Sierra Leone to reduce cases of Lassa fever [32]. The inter-
vention involved incidence mapping, contact tracing to warn
relatives of the dangers of secondary infection, and education
to exposed populations in methods of avoiding exposure to
rodents, the reservoir of the disease. Prevention posters in-
cluded graphic depictions to instruct villagers in techniques for
protecting food from rodents, trapping rodents, dealing safely
with carcasses of dead rats, and symptom recognition. As part
of the campaign, local musicians were even commissioned to
write and perform songs about routes of transmission of Lassa
fever and preventative measures. These outreach activities were
an attempt to increase awareness of the disease and to promote
behavior change aimed at reducing incident cases of Lassa fever
through reducing the risk of exposure to animals, in this case
rodents.
We have implemented similar risk-reduction measures in
our own work with Cameroonian bushmeat hunters through
“healthy hunter” education sessions. These sessions are de-
signed to encourage hunters to reduce their contact with wild
animal blood and body fluids. We educate hunters in this pro-
gram on pathogens that can be found in wild animals, which
species are believed to pose the greatest risk with regard to the
transmission of zoonotic agents, and what steps can be taken
to avoid possible infections. Although it is important to explain
that the best way to avoid infections is to not handle animals
and to limit one’s exposure to animal blood and body fluids,
for many people, hunting and butchering represent an essential
part of daily food preparation. Thus, the focus of this inter-
vention is on reducing the risk of zoonotic infection and not
necessarily the practice of bushmeat hunting itself. With this
in mind, the interactive education sessions are meant to inform
individuals of precautions that may be taken to reduce the risk
of being infected with a zoonotic agent when engaged in high-
risk practices such as hunting and butchering. Such precautions
include avoiding the hunting of nonhuman primates, because
they share many diseases and infections with humans; avoiding
butchering or handling animal meat if there are injuries on the
hands or arms; immediately washing any bites, scratches, cuts,
or injuries obtained during hunting or butchering, preferably
with soap; and avoiding contact with animal carcasses found
in the forest.
More research is needed to determine the efficacy of reduc-
ing disease spread through social mobilization, public health
education, behavioral change, and communication strategies.
Although it is challenging to measure behavioral change effi-
cacy in reducing the risk of transmission of potential pathogens,
program evaluation will be important in defining replicable
behavioral change and communication models that are useful
in emerging infectious disease “hot spots,” those regions that
have disproportionately given rise to the majority of human
diseases. If they prove to be effective, behavior modification
measures may have an enormous impact on curtailing disease
emergence and progression in conjunction with other strategies.
THE FUTURE OF PANDEMICS
The ongoing global HIV pandemic, the recent outbreaks of
pathogens such as SARS and the H5N1 influenza virus, as well
as the current H1N1 influenza pandemic, the global conse-
quences of which are still to be determined, demonstrate our
continued vulnerability to emerging infectious diseases. The
most recent example, H1N1 influenza, and its dramatic spread
also reminds us that we have entered into a new age of global
pandemics, largely because of the rapidity with which newly
emergent pathogens are capable of being transmitted around
the world. Because of our continued vulnerability and the chal-
lenges that global travel poses to pandemic control, it is now
more important than ever that we identify emerging infectious
diseases early. Although it is still difficult to predict the agent
that will pose the next pandemic threat, when it will occur or
where it will begin, it will likely be the result of cross-species
transmission from animals to humans. This likelihood argues
in favor of developing a system aimed at detecting the trans-
mission of potentially pathogenic agents from animals to hu-
mans early in the zoonotic disease emergence process and iden-
tifying ways by which we can diminish the risk of transmission,
especially in populations that are highly exposed to animals
and their potentially zoonotic agents.
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